Kant considers his first edition of transcendental deduction as a premise for his B deduction, according to which the intuitions given to us by space and time are brought under a unified subject through a transcendental synthesis. Nietzsche rejects this unified subject, arguing that it develops out of experience. He replaces Kant’s unified subject and synthesis with a subjective multiplicity of drives and Will to Power. The Kantian objection of how the illusion of a unified subject is formed if we are a subjective multiplicity of drives casts doubt on this replacement. To address this objection, I adopt Rosenthal’s developmental account of consciousness. Through this adoption, I demonstrate how the illusion of a unified subject is formed and clarify the strong implications (of lack of self-knowledge and lack of agency) accompanying Nietzsche’s account of consciousness.
Postgraduate Dissertation
A Nietzschean Entfernung from Kantian Foundations: The Illusion of the Unified Subject
